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ABSTRACT 
In this note, we propose a security mechanism for protecting IPv6 
networks from possible abuses caused by the malicious usage of a 
multihoming protocol. In the presented approach, each 
multihomed node is assigned multiple prefixes from its upstream 
providers, and it creates the interface identifier part of its 
addresses by incorporating a cryptographic one-way hash of the 
available prefix set. The result is that the addresses of each 
multihomed node form an unalterable set of intrinsically bound 
IPv6 addresses. This allows any node that is communicating with 
the multihomed node to securely verify that all the alternative 
addresses proposed through the multihoming protocol are 
associated to the address used for establishing the communication. 
The verification process is extremely efficient because it only 
involves hash operations. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks] Security and 
protection.  
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
IPv6, multihoming, hijacking protection. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to preserve global routing system scalability, the IPv6 
community is advocating the massive adoption of Provider 
Aggregatable addressing and limiting the assignment of Provider 
Independent address blocks to the subscribers of the ISPs (i.e. end 
sites). Such an approach forces multihomed sites, i.e. sites 
connecting to the Internet through multiple providers, to obtain 
multiple Provider Aggregatable prefixes, one from each of their 
provider’s address blocks. Moreover, since ISPs only announce 
their own prefix block into the global routing system, a 
multihomed host is reachable at a given address only through the 
corresponding ISP. Consequently, in order to be reachable 
through all the available ISPs, a multihomed host, i.e. a host 
within the multihomed site, needs to configure as many addresses 
as prefixes are available in the multihomed site.  
While this setup guarantees the scalability of the multihoming 
solution, such multi-addressed configuration presents additional 
difficulties when attempting to provide the fault tolerance 
capabilities required to a multihoming solution. In particular, the 
preservation of established communications when an outage 
affects the provider through which the communication is flowing 
becomes challenging, since in order to re-home the 
communication to an alternative ISP, an alternative address must 
be used to exchange packets. What is more, such adaptation of the 
addresses used during the lifetime of the communication to the 
available providers has to be performed in a transparent fashion 
with respect to transport and application layers, in order to 
actually preserve the established communication. This is so 
because current applications and transport layers, such as TCP 
and UDP, identify the endpoints of a communication through the 
IP addresses of the nodes involved, implying that the IP addresses 
selected at the communication establishment time must remain 
invariant through the lifetime of the communication. Therefore, 
after an outage, packets need to carry an alternative address, 
corresponding to an available ISP, in order to be able to reach 
their destination, but they need to be presented to transport and 
application layers as if they contain the original address, in order 
to be recognized as belonging to the established communication. 
Such an approach requires additional mechanisms in both ends of 
the communication in order to perform a coherent mapping 
between the IP addresses presented to the transport and 
application layers and those addresses actually contained in the 
packets [1]. 
This mapping mechanism between addresses used for forwarding 
packets (also known as locators) and the addresses presented to 
the upper layers (also known as identifiers) may be vulnerable to 
redirection attacks [2] if no proper protection is provided. The 
vulnerability is introduced when an attacker can benefit from the 
mapping mechanism to induce a victim to believe that he/she is 
communicating with the owner of a given identifier while he/she 
is actually exchanging packets with a locator that does not belong 
to the owner of the identifier. In other words, a redirection attack 
consists in creating a false mapping between an identifier and a 
locator. In particular, if no end to end cryptographic integrity 
protection is used, a redirection attack can result in 
communication hijacking, allowing the attacker to impersonate 
one of the parties involved in the communication. 
In this note we propose a security mechanism to protect a protocol 
for preserving established communication through outages in 
multihomed environments from redirection attacks. The proposed 
mechanism relies on the capability of generating all the addresses 
of a multihomed host as an unalterable set of intrinsically bound 
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IPv6 addresses. In this system, a multihomed host incorporates a 
cryptographic one-way hash of the prefix-set available in the 
multihomed site into the interface identifier part of its own 
addresses, i.e. the lower 64 bits of the IPv6 address. The result is 
that the binding between all the addresses of a multihomed host is 
encoded within the addresses themselves, providing hijacking 
protection. Any party that is communicating with a multihomed 
node can efficiently verify that the alternative addresses proposed 
for continuing the communication are bound to the initial address 
through a simple hash calculation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we provide some essential background about multihoming and 
multihoming security. In Section 3 we present the proposed 
solution, including a detailed security analysis. Next, in Section 4 
we present alternative approaches based in the usage of public key 
cryptography and we compare them with the proposed solution. 
We finish this note with a section that includes our conclusions. 
2. BACKGROUND 
In this section we first present a brief overview of a solution for 
preserving established communications in multihomed 
environments and then we attempt to identify potential threats to 
the resulting system. 
Host MH
Pref1:l1:iid1
Pref2:l2:iid2
…
PrefN:lN:iidN
Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider N
BGP route exchange
…
Host H
 
Figure 1. Multihoming with PA addressing. 
 
As we described in the Introduction, a multihomed host that is 
connected to the Internet through N providers, ISP1,…, ISPN, 
obtains N prefixes, Pref1::/n1,…, PrefN::/nN. Consequently, a 
host located within the multihomed site will have N addresses, 
one per available ISP/prefix, Pref1:l1:iid1, 
Pref2:l2:iid2,…,PrefN:lN:iidN, (being li the corresponding 
subnet id as defined in [3]) as presented in figure 1. In order to 
preserve established communications through outages, a 
multihoming mechanism located in a shim layer within the IP 
layer is proposed [4]. The shim layer is located between the IP 
endpoint sub-layer (that performs end to end functions like 
fragmenting and IPSec) and the IP routing sub-layer (that 
performs network related functions like forwarding), as depicted 
in figure 2. The multihoming mechanism of the shim layer adjusts 
the address used for exchanging packets according to the available 
providers, while always presenting a constant address to the upper 
layers of the stack. The result is that the shim layer performs a 
mapping between the identifier presented to the upper layers and 
the locator actually used to exchange packets on the wire. It 
should be noted that both nodes involved in the communication 
have to support the mechanism in order to present a coherent view 
of the addresses involved in the communication. Both ends 
exchange the information about alternative locators using a 
multihoming protocol between the shim layers, as presented in 
figure 2. 
TCP/UDP layer
App1 App2 AppN…
IP layer
Multihoming shim layer
Identifiers
Locators
End-point
functions
Routing
functions
Multihoming 
protocol Shim
layer
 
Figure 2. Multihoming protocol layer architecture. 
 
The adoption of such a mechanism enables the possibility of new 
attacks [2]. The major concern is posed by the possibility of 
performing so-called redirection attacks, where an attacker can 
persuade a victim to re-home a communication to a locator that is 
not associated with the identifier used in the communication. 
There are essentially two types of redirection attack: hijacking and 
flooding. In a hijacking attack the attacker impersonates one of 
the parties of the communication. The new hijacking attack 
enabled by the adoption of a multihoming shim layer is performed 
by binding the target identifier to the attacker’s locator in the 
multihoming mechanism of the victim node. In this way, when the 
victim node communicates with the target identifier, it will be 
actually exchanging packets with the attacker. This is a serious 
attack, since the attacker is managing to steal the identity of the 
target node. The shim layer also enables a new type of flooding 
attack, in which the attacker establishes a communication using its 
own identifier and then re-homes the communication to a victim’s 
locator. The result is that the victim will be flooded by the flow of 
the communication initiated by the attacker.  
In general terms, it seems wise to require that any additional 
mechanism introduced to the Internet architecture must, at least, 
not introduce new vulnerabilities to the network. In this particular 
case of multihoming, this means that the security of the 
multihoming solution is not required to protect against man-in-
the-middle attacks but it definitely must prevent the so-called 
future attacks [2], also known as time-shifted attacks [5], as 
presented next. In the current Internet, it is clear that any attacker 
can perform a redirection attack as long as he/she is placed along 
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the path if no additional security measures are adopted. This 
means it would be somehow acceptable that a multihoming 
solution is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, since this 
vulnerability exists in the current Internet. However, in the current 
Internet, the effects of a hijacking attack are limited to the period 
during which the attacker is placed along the path. As soon as the 
attacker leaves his/her on-path location, the attack finishes. In a 
future attack the attacker launches the attack from an on-path 
location and then he/she leaves, but the effects of the attack 
remain long after the attacker has left. Such attacks could be 
enabled through a multihoming mechanism, since the attacker 
may only need to be along the path during the time required to 
add additional locators through the multihoming mechanism. 
Proper security measures are required to prevent such attacks. In 
the next, section we present a mechanism to prevent future 
hijacking attacks to the multihoming protocol. 
3. EFFICIENT SECURITY FOR 
MULTIHOMING 
In this section we present the Efficient Security for Multihoming 
(ESM) architecture to prevent future hijacking attacks and 
flooding attacks in multihomed environments. The ESM 
architecture consists of a novel technique to generate a new type 
of IPv6 addresses called Hash Based Addresses (named HBAs), 
and a security protocol to protect the multihoming information. In 
this section we will first describe the algorithm for generating sets 
of Hash Based Addresses as sets of intrinsically bound IPv6 
addresses associated with an arbitrary set of prefixes. Then we 
will describe how these addresses are used in the ESM protocol 
for protecting multihoming exchanges of information. 
 
3.1 Hash Based Addresses  
We next describe a procedure to generate sets of Hash Based 
Addresses (HBAs). HBAs are cryptographic in nature, because 
they contain a one-way hash of the prefix set available in the 
multihomed site and other parameters in the identifier part of the 
addresses. In other words, given an arbitrary set of N prefixes, the 
HBA set generation algorithm produces a HBA set of N 
addresses. Each one of the generated addresses has a different 
prefix from the input prefix set, while their interface identifier part 
contains information about the complete prefix set in the form of a 
hash of the set. Because of their nature, each address contains 
information about all the other addresses of the set and a receiver 
can easily verify if two addresses belong to the same set through 
an efficient operation such as a hash. After this verification, the 
receiver can securely use them interchangeably, as we will see in 
Section 3.2. 
So, in order to benefit from the proposed security mechanism, the 
addresses of each multihomed host have to constitute an HBA set. 
In a general multihoming scenario as the one presented in Section 
2, a multihomed host attached to a link where N 64-bit prefixes 
[3] are available (Pref1:l1::/64, Pref2:l2::/64,…, PrefN:lN::/64) 
generates the interface identifier part of each one of its addresses 
as a 64-bit hash of the prefix set available in the link and a 
random nonce. Including a random nonce enables the generation 
of multiple HBA sets associated with the same prefix set. The “u” 
and the “g” bits of the interface identifier are set to zero in order 
to avoid confusing the resulting addresses with globally unique 
EUI-64 identifiers [6]. After generating the interface identifier 
parts, the addresses of the HBA set are finally generated by 
prepending the different prefixes of the prefix set with the 
interface identifier parts. 
So, summarizing, the procedure for generating an HBA set of N 
intrinsically bound addresses for a prefix set containing 
Pref1:l1::/64, Pref2:l2::/64,…, PrefN:lN::/64 is the following: 
First, a 128-bit random nonce RN is generated. Proper care should 
be taken for ensuring randomness as it is discussed in [7] 
Second, for each prefix Prefi:li::/64, an interface identifier is 
generated as 
iid = Hash64bit(RN , Pref1:l1 ,…, PrefN:lN)     (the 
“u” and the “g” bits are reset)  
The corresponding address is generated by prepending the prefix 
with the interface identifier part (Prefi:li:iid) 
After generating the address set, the node performs the Duplicate 
Address Detection procedure as defined in [8]. If any of the 
addresses collides with an existing one, a new random nonce is 
generated and a new HBA set is generated.  
The output of the described procedure is a HBA set of N 
addresses that carry information about the prefixes available in the 
multihomed site within their interface identifier part. The 
generation procedure is completely automatic, and it does not 
require any manual configuration, eliminating any administrative 
burden usually required by security procedures.  
It should be noted that it would be possible to generate the 
addresses of an HBA set with different interface identifiers to 
provide some privacy features. In order to do that, it is necessary 
to change the order of the inputs of the hash function when 
calculating the interface identifiers for each prefix. 
3.2 Security Protocol 
Once the multihomed host has generated its addresses as a HBA 
set, we propose the ESM protocol to securely exchange 
multihoming information. We next describe the ESM protocol 
using the following notation: MH and H are principals, being MH 
the multihomed host and H any other host of the Internet. 
Pref1:l1:iid,  Pref2:l2:iid ,…, PrefN:lN:iid are the addresses of 
MH that were generated as a HBA set. RN is the random nonce 
associated with the HBA set. AH is the address of H (without loss 
of generality, we are assuming here that H has a single address for 
simplicity). 
Suppose that MH is communicating with H and that they are 
using addresses Prefi:li:iid and AH respectively. So far, no 
multihoming specific features were used; in particular, Prefi:li:iid 
and AH are used both as identifiers for upper layer protocols 
(transport and application protocols) and as locators for 
exchanging packets. In order to benefit from enhanced fault 
tolerance capabilities provided by multihoming, MH informs H 
about the alternative addresses available for the communication, 
so that they can be used in case of an outage.  
Since MH’s addresses form an HBA set, it is enough for MH to 
convey the information needed by H to re-generate the HBA set, 
i.e. the prefix set and the random nonce RN. 
MH   —›   H: {Pref1:l1/64, Pref2:l2/64,…, PrefN:lN/64}, RN 
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Upon the reception of the HBA set information, H verifies that the 
address used for establishing the communication, Prefi:li:iid, 
belongs to the HBA set. For that purpose, H first verifies that 
Prefi:li::/64 is included in the received prefix set. If this 
verification is successful, H then verifies that Prefi:li:iid 
corresponds to the address #i of the HBA set generated using the 
generation algorithm described in the previous section with the 
received parameters. 
Once H has verified that the HBA set associated with the received 
parameters contains the initial address Prefi:li:iid, H generates the 
full HBA set using the generation algorithm described in the 
previous section. So far, H is certain that all the alternative 
addresses available for MH have been generated by the same 
entity.  
Then H verifies that the party located at the alternative address is 
willing to receive the traffic associated to the established 
communication at this new location to prevent flooding attacks. 
To achieve this, a reachability test is included in the ESM 
protocol that consists of a two-way exchange. The defined packet 
exchange includes the random nonce RN to verify that the same 
entity is located at the initial and the alternative address. The 
provision of additional protection against flooding attacks may 
require tools that are out of the scope of this note. 
It should be noted, that the last two operations, i.e. the 
regeneration of the HBA set and the reachability tests for the 
alternative locators, do not need to be performed upon the 
reception of the prefix set, but they can be deferred until an 
alternative locator is needed because of an outage (which may 
never occur). Moreover, when an alternative locator, is needed, it 
is not required to regenerate the whole HBA set, but alternative 
locators can be regenerated independently using the involved 
parts of the aforementioned HBA creation procedure. 
By means of the ESM protocol, H can securely use any of the 
addresses of the HBA set interchangeably for exchanging packets 
in the established communication. 
3.3 Security Analysis 
3.3.1 Protection from hijacking attacks 
The security of the protocol to protect from hijacking attacks is 
based on the property that any modification of the inputs of the 
HBA set generation process would result in a different set. Since 
what is being protected is the mapping between different 
addresses, producing a valid mapping between other addresses 
that are not contained in the original set is not an actual threat. We 
will next illustrate this argument by presenting a possible attack 
and calculating the effort required to perform it. 
In the scenario presented in the previous section, a multihomed 
host MH is communicating with another host H. MH has 
generated its addresses through the HBA set generation algorithm, 
resulting in Pref1:l1:iid, Pref2:l2:iid ,…, PrefN:lN:iid. Host H 
has a single address AH. MH and H are communicating using 
addresses Prefi:li:iid and AH respectively. Consider now an 
attacker X that has the intention of redirecting the communication 
to an alternative address. We assume that it is enough for the 
attacker to redirect the communication to any address of a given 
prefix, PrefX::/64. The rationale behind this assumption is that X 
has access to any address of the considered prefix. 
So, in order to hijack the communication, X must introduce a new 
prefix in the prefix set used for generating the HBA set of MH. 
For that, X is required to obtain a combination of prefix set and 
random nonce such as: 
1- Prefi:li/64 and PrefX::/64 are included in the prefix set 
2- Prefi:li:iid is included in the resulting HBA set 
The other inputs may be changed at will by the attacker; for 
instance, the random nonce and the other prefixes of the prefix set 
can be altered. In any case, in order to obtain the desired HBA set, 
the attacker needs to try with different inputs, for instance with 
different random nonces, until the above two conditions are met. 
The expected number of times that the generation procedure needs 
to be repeated until the desired outcome is reached depends on the 
number of hash bits included in the interface identifier part of the 
HBAs. Since we are considering 64-bit long interface identifiers 
and that the “u” and the “g” bits are not used, the expected 
number of iterations required for a brute force attack is O(2^61).  
In order to quantify the actual effort required to perform such 
attack, we next calculate the amount of time that is required for an 
attacker to obtain the proper parameter set. As stated before, the 
attacker needs to perform O(2^61) hash operations and the 
corresponding comparisons. Assuming that the attacker uses only 
two prefixes and the modifier, in order to minimize the amount of 
data to be hashed, each round the attacker will need to hash 32 
bytes. According to openssl speed1, a computer with a 
Pentium 4 processor (2.66 Ghz) and 440 MB of RAM, can hash 
20945 kB per second, when hashing blocks of 32 bytes. This 
means that it would take approximately 110.000 years to perform 
the number of hash operations required to obtain the proper 
parameter set. 
We believe that the resulting security is enough for protecting 
regular traffic, which currently flows unprotected through the 
network, from potential redirection attacks introduced by the 
multihoming mechanisms, since the resulting protection is similar 
to the one offered by other current network security protocols 
such as the protection provided by Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses [9] (CGA) in SeND [10].  
As processing power increases, the protection provided by this 
mechanism decreases, since the amount of time required to try 
with 2^61 different random nonces also decreases. However, 
additional mechanisms can be used to improve the protection 
provided by the ESM protocol. For instance artificially increasing 
the effort required for generating a valid HBA set, similar to the 
Sec parameter used in CGAs, would result in additional 
protection. 
3.3.2 Protection from flooding attacks 
In this section we will present that the usage of the HBA format 
makes very difficult to launch a flooding attack against a specific 
address, while it does not prevent from flooding attacks against a 
specific prefix. Therefore additional protection such as a 
reachability test is required. 
Consider the case where an attacker X has easy access to a prefix 
PrefX::/64. X wants to launch a flooding attack to a host located 
                                                                
1 openssl speed is a command part of the OpenSSL Project, 
www.openssl.org. 
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in the address Prefi:li:iid. The attack would consist of establishing 
a communication with a server S and requesting a heavy flow 
from it. Then simply redirect the flow to Prefi:li:iid, flooding the 
target. In order to perform this attack X needs to generate an HBA 
set including the prefixes Prefi:li::/64 and PrefX::/64 in the prefix 
set. Additionally the resulting HBA set must contain Prefi:li:iid. 
In order to obtain this, the attacker needs to find the appropriate 
Random Nonce RN. The expected number of attempts required to 
find such RN value is O(2^61). Because of this we can conclude 
that HBAs provide sufficient protection from this type of attacks. 
However, the target of a flooding attack is not limited to specific  
hosts, but the attack can also be launched against other elements 
of the infrastructure, such as routers or access links. In order to do 
that, the attacker can establish a communication with a server S 
starting the download of a heavy flow. Then, the attacker redirects 
the communication to any address of the prefix assigned to the 
target network. Even if the target address is not assigned to any 
host, the flow will flood the access link of the target site, and the 
site access router will also suffer the overload. Such attack cannot 
be prevented using HBAs, since the attacker can easily generate 
an HBA set using his own prefix and the target network prefix. In 
order to prevent such attacks, additional mechanisms such as 
reachability tests are required. 
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
As it is described in Section 2, the goal of the proposed protocol 
is to secure the binding between the address that is being used as 
identifier by the upper layer protocols and the alternative 
addresses that will be used as locators for that communication. 
There are alternative mechanisms to achieve the same goal. 
However, we argue that the ESM protocol is the most efficient 
one, because it does not involve asymmetric key operations and it 
does not require any infrastructure for key distribution. In this 
section we present a brief description of some alternative 
approaches based on public key cryptography, and then we 
perform a qualitative and a quantitative comparison between the 
public key based approaches and ESM. 
4.1  Alternative Approaches 
Several alternative approaches are based on the usage of public 
key cryptography. Among them we can find Strong Identity 
Multihoming (SIM) protocol [11], the application of the Host 
Identity Protocol (HIP) [12] to multihoming [13] and the 
application of Cryptographic Generated Addresses (CGA) [9] [14] 
to multihoming [15].  
The first two approaches, i.e. SIM and HIP, create a new 128-bit 
identifier namespace. The new endpoint identifier is the 128-bit 
hash of the public key of the node. In a CGA based approach, no 
new identifier namespace is created, but the address of the 
multihomed node is a CGA that contains a hash of a public key in 
its interface identifier. In any case, the result is a secure binding 
between the identifier (whether a new 128-identifier or the CGA) 
and the associated key pair. This allows the multihomed host to 
use the corresponding private key to sign the multihomed 
messages that convey alternative address information. The trust 
chain in this case is the following: the identifier used for the 
communication is securely bound to the key pair because it 
contains the hash of the public key, and the alternative address is 
bound to the public key through the signature. This approach 
provides the required protection, since it is invulnerable to future 
hijacking attacks. Additional flooding protection similar to the 
one used in ESM is still required though.  
Other approaches are also possible, but when the address used as 
an identifier by the upper layers is not intrinsically bound to 
something else (e.g. a public key or a prefix set), an external trust 
source is required to provide the binding. This means that a third 
trusted party, like a public key infrastructure (PKI) is required. 
Such approaches are extremely difficult to deploy because they 
require a global infrastructure for key distribution making its 
application unsuitable for the general case where any two arbitrary 
nodes in the Internet are communicating. On the other hand, this 
approach may make sense in a restricted environment where such 
infrastructure is available for the involved parties. However, this 
solution would still relay on extensive usage of public key 
operations. This implies that the computational cost of the 
operation would be similar to the case of CGAs, that will be 
shown on section 4.3. 
4.2 Qualitative Comparison 
The major advantage of a public key based approach with respect 
to ESM is that they support dynamic address sets. In ESM, the 
HBA set is determined at the generation moment and cannot be 
changed afterwards, implying that no new alternative addresses 
can be added during the communication. In a public key based 
approach, it is possible to add new alternative locators at any 
point of the lifetime of the communication, facilitating an 
integrated mobility-multihoming support. This is due to the 
additional level of indirection provided by the binding with the 
key pair. However, the public key based approach requires the 
intensive usage of public key cryptography, since for each 
addition of a new alternative address public key operations are 
performed. On the other hand, the ESM protocol only requires 
hash operations, which are cheaper, as the results of the 
quantitative analysis performed in the next section show. This is 
particularly relevant in some scenarios like highly loaded public 
servers that maintain thousands of simultaneous communications. 
As presented earlier, the different public key based approaches 
use diverse identifier namespaces. In particular, SIM and HIP 
create a new identifier namespace while the CGA-based approach 
use IPv6 addresses as identifier. This difference has a great impact 
in terms of deployment and backward compatibility. As opposed 
to IPv6 addresses, the new identifiers used in SIM and HIP cannot 
be used as locators. This means, that a new directory service that 
provides a mapping between identifiers and locators is needed to 
allow endpoints to obtain the locators corresponding to a given 
identifier. The implementation of such directory service is far 
from trivial, since the proposed identifier namespace is flat 
because of its own cryptographic nature. The lack of such 
directory service results in a poor support of some of the existent 
applications. For instance, applications that perform referrals or 
call-backs would simply fail if no identifier-to-locator mapping is 
available [16]. Because of this limitation, we consider that the 
SIM and HIP approaches are not directly comparable in 
quantitative terms to the ESM approach.  
On the other hand, a CGA-based approach would indeed provide 
similar application support. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
resulting security level is the same in both approaches, since the 
strength of the resulting binding is determined by the number of 
bits of the interface identifier part of the IPv6 address. The result 
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communications Review 65 Volume 35, Number 2, April 2005
  
is that these two approaches provide similar capabilities and 
application support, enabling a detailed quantitative comparison 
between them. 
4.3 Quantitative Comparison 
In this section we compare the computational cost of the CGA-
based approach and the proposed ESM mechanism. We analyze 
the two major operations involved: the bootstrap process where 
the elements required in each approach are generated and the 
establishment of the session context where the alternative locators 
are exchanged and verified. 
4.3.1 Bootstrapping 
During the bootstrap process, the elements required for each 
mechanism are generated. In the case of ESM, the HBA set is 
generated while in the CGA-based mechanism the set of CGAs is 
generated. We will next compare the computational effort 
required in each case. 
In the case of ESM, the bootstrap process involves the generation 
of the HBA set. For this, the generation procedure described in 
Section 3.1 is executed. The computational effort of such 
procedure is due to the generation of the 128-bit random nonce 
RN and the posterior hash operation. So, in a configuration where 
N prefixes are available in the multihomed site, then the 
computational effort of generating an HBA set is: 
 
GHBA(N) = GRN +  H(N) 
 
being GRN the effort of generating a 128-bit random number and 
H(N) the effort of computing a hash of N prefixes. 
In the case of CGA, the bootstrap process starts with the 
generation of the public and private key pair. Then, for each of the 
N prefixes, a random nonce is generated and the address is 
generated including the hash of the random nonce, the public key 
and the correspondent prefix. So, in a scenario where there are N 
prefixes in the multihomed site, the computational effort of 
generating the CGA addresses is: 
 
GCGA (N) = GPkpair + N * (GRN + H) 
 
being GPkpair the effort of generating a public/private key pair, GRN 
the effort of generating a 128-bit random nonce and H the effort 
of hashing the public key, the random nonce and a prefix. 
The efforts GHBA(N) and GCGA(N) can be measured and compared 
in terms of the time required for the computation of the involved 
operations. We have calculated the values for GHBA(N) and 
GCGA(N) using the OpenSSL tools in a computer with a Pentium 4 
processor (2.66 Ghz) and 440 MB of RAM for different values of 
N (2, 3, 5, 10) and for two different RSA public key lengths (512 
and 1024 bits). The hash algorithm used is SHA-1. The results are 
included in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Time required for HBA and CGA bootstrapping  
N GHBA GCGA – 512 GCGA – 1024 
2 6 µs 31,9 ms 157,8 ms 
3 6 µs 31,9 ms 157,8 ms 
5 6 µs 31,9 ms 157,8 ms 
10 7 µs 31,9 ms 157,8 ms 
 
The above results show that the effort required for bootstrapping 
the ESM mechanisms is near to 4 orders of magnitude lower that 
the effort required for bootstrapping a CGA based solution (using 
512 bits keys).  
However, the bootstrapping process is not frequently executed, so 
a poor performance is not so critical and cannot be determinant to 
select the ESM solution over the CGA-based solution. In the next 
section we analyze the effort of establishing a session context, 
which is a much more significant operation because of its 
frequency.  
4.3.2 Session Context Establishment  
After the bootstrapping, the node is ready to benefit from the 
capabilities provided by the multihoming solution. This means 
that when a new communication is established, the node can setup 
a multihoming session context so that the communication can be 
preserved through outages. Such session context establishment 
includes the exchange and validation of the alternative locators for 
that communication. In this section we will compare the effort 
required for the verification of the alternative locator set in each 
one of the analyzed approaches. 
As described in section 3.2, in the case of the ESM protocol, the 
node that receives the alternative locator set of its peer verifies it 
though the following operation: it first generates the HBA set 
associated with the received parameter and then it verifies if the 
address used as identifier for the communication is included in the 
resulting set. Therefore, the effort of the verification process in a 
scenario with N prefixes is: 
 
VHBA(N) =  H(N) 
 
being H(N) the effort of computing the hash of N prefixes. 
In the case of the CGA-based protocol, the node receiving the 
alternative locators from its peer will perform two operations: 
first, it verifies that the received public key corresponds to the 
CGA used as identifier of the established communication, and 
next it verifies the signature of the message that contains the 
alternative locator set. The effort of the verification process with 
N prefixes is: 
 
VCGA(N) = H + SPK(N-1) 
 
being H the effort of computing a hash of the public key and 
SPK(N-1) the effort of verifying a signature of a message with N-1 
alternative locators.  
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Similarly to the previous section, we measure the effort in terms 
of the time required to perform the computations. So, using the 
same tools and the same infrastructure as in the previous section, 
we calculate the computational effort for establishing a session 
context for different values of N (2, 3, 5, 10) and for two different 
RSA public key length values (512 and 1024 bits). The hash 
algorithm used is SHA-1. The results are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Time required for a locator set verification 
N VHBA VCGA – 512 VCGA -1024 
2 1,5 µs 141 µs 425 µs 
3 1,5 µs 176 µs 531 µs 
5 1,5 µs 244 µs 742 µs 
10 1,6 µs 418 µs 1271 µs 
 
The obtained results show that the verification procedure of the 
ESM approach is at least 2 orders of magnitude more efficient 
than the CGA based verification process. The session context 
establishment operation is used extensively by the protocol, since 
each new communication performs it. So, an increase of a couple 
of orders of magnitude in this operation seems definitely 
determinant for selecting a security mechanism for a general 
purpose multihoming mechanism as the one being consider in this 
paper. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have described the ESM architecture, a novel security 
solution for protecting multihoming mechanisms from redirection 
attacks. The resulting protection prevents future hijacking attacks 
and flooding attacks. However, the proposed solution does not 
provide protection against man-in-the-middle attackers. 
The ESM architecture achieves the described protection by 
defining a new type of addresses called HBAs that contain within 
the interface identifier a one-way hash of the prefix set available 
in the multihomed site. This technique allows each multihomed 
host to create a secure binding between all its available addresses. 
The resulting binding is easily verifiable by the communicating 
nodes since it is contained in the addresses themselves. Probably, 
the most remarkable feature of the proposed solution is that no 
cryptographic keys or secrets are used in the protocol. Moreover, 
all the information used in the ESM protocol is exchanged in clear 
text and can be sniffed and/or spoofed by any attacker without 
compromising the security. Instead, the security of the protocol is 
based in the fact that any modification of the parameters used to 
generate the address would result in a different address, i.e. the 
attack would not affect the target but an alternative address. 
The ESM protocol is extremely efficient because it only involves 
hash operations; no public key operations are required. In 
addition, the proposed solution is easy to use, because manual 
configuration is not required. Compared with a similar approach 
based on the usage of CGA, the proposed ESM mechanisms is 
near to 4 orders of magnitude more efficient during the 
bootstrapping and it is over 2 orders of magnitude more efficient 
during the lifetime of the communication. 
However, it should be noted that the CGA based mechanism 
provides some features that may be required for certain scenarios, 
like mobile environments. In this case, it is possible to merge 
these two approaches into an integrated mechanism by including a 
hash of both a public key and a prefix set as inputs into the 
interface identifier of the IPv6 address. For this it is possible to 
define a new CGA extension that contains the prefix set [17]. The 
resulting mechanism would allow the usage of the HBA and/or 
CGA features depending on the situation preserving the enhanced 
efficiency when the HBA mode is used. 
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